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Abstract: Many public health and healthcare organizations use formal knowledge 
management practices to identify and disseminate the experiences gained over time. The 
“lessons-learned” approach is one such example of knowledge management practice 
applied to the wider concept of organizational learning. In the field of emergency 
preparedness, the lessons-learned approach stands on the assumption that learning from 
experience improves practice and minimizes avoidable deaths and negative economic and 
social consequences of disasters. In this project, we performed a structured review of 
AARs to analyze how lessons learned from the response to real-incidents may be used to 
maximize knowledge management and quality improvement practices such as the design of 
public health emergency preparedness (PHEP) exercises. We chose as a source of data the 
“Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov)” system, a joined program of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security DHS and FEMA that serves as the national, online 
repository of lessons learned, best practices, and innovative ideas. We identified recurring 
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challenges reported by various states and local public health agencies in the response to 
different types of incidents. We also strived to identify the limitations of systematic 
learning that can be achieved due to existing weaknesses in the way AARs are developed.  
Keywords: lessons learned; after action report (AAR); knowledge management; 
organizational learning; emergency preparedness 
 
1. Introduction 
In order to improve their performance, many public health and healthcare organizations use formal 
knowledge management practices to identify and disseminate the experience gained by individuals and 
groups over time. The “lessons-learned” approach is one such example of knowledge management 
practice applied to the wider concept of organizational learning. In the field of emergency 
preparedness, the lessons-learned approach stands on the assumption that learning from experience, 
whether it be our own experience or others’, and whether it be from real events or simulations, 
improves practice and minimizes avoidable deaths and negative economic and social consequences of 
disasters [1,2]. Thus, the appeal of learning from experience to avoid duplicating mistakes is widely 
appreciated in the emergency preparedness arena, and many organizations have adopted formal 
procedures for identifying, documenting and disseminating lessons-learned from prior response to 
emergency situations and simulations.  
Over the years, public health and emergency management agencies have utilized several disparate 
modes for collecting and sharing such experience, including in-progress reviews, “hot-washes”, 
various forms of debriefings and after-action reports (AARs) [3]. AARs, originally developed by the 
U.S. Army, are now widely used by non-military organizations, businesses, and health-care and public 
health agencies as tools for gathering and documenting evaluations of key processes during the 
response to both real-incidents and fictional exercises. In fact, in the United States (U.S.), formal 
AARs are now required by several agencies and organizations that fund, oversee, or regulate aspects of 
public health and healthcare emergency preparedness and response, including the Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
the Joint Commission [4,5]. Yet, despite voluminous attempts to document and learn from prior 
emergency preparedness system response failures, the challenges experienced in planning and 
responding to disasters seem to be “learned” over and over again in disaster after disaster [6] 
suggesting that, while review of incidents and the identification of lessons may be more readily 
accomplished, true organizational and systems-level learning remains difficult to achieve. Some of this 
difficulty may have to do with the variability and variety of healthcare and public health “systems” in 
the U.S. As early as 1988, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) acknowledged that the public health “system” 
was “a complex network of individuals and organizations that, when working together, can represent 
‘what we as a society do collectively to assure the conditions in which people can be healthy’” [7]. 
However, it has been only recently that greater numbers of researchers have begun to study “public 
health systems” in earnest. However, beyond the challenges inherent in maintaining disparate and 
heterogeneous public health systems, Auf der Heide also discussed the common pitfalls seen in the Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9  2951 
 
 
lessons-learned approach itself, commenting that recurring difficulties in responding to disasters are 
due, in part, to the failure of organizations to produce generalized recommendations that have meaning 
outside of the context of a specific event [8]. Seid et al. suggest that, at the level of individual 
organizations, this failure relates to a disconnection between the observation of challenges and the 
implementation of solutions, and advances that information from AARs better drive process change if 
formalized procedures are developed to follow through improvement efforts [9]. Because of this type 
of concern, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Homeland Security Exercise 
Evaluation Program (HSEEP) now requires linking of lessons observed to the planned execution of 
improvement efforts [10]. For example, for each response issue identified in an AAR, HSEEP 
guidelines recommended that specific work processes and capabilities are identified and targeted to 
improve organizational or system performance, and exercises and drills used to test the changes being 
implemented.  
Therefore, there is a need for both a well-ordered and exchangeable information system that 
compiles post-event reviews of what worked and what did not in the response to specific incidents, as 
well as a need for structured and rigorous data reviews of aggregations of such reports to help make 
the most appropriate recommendations for systems-wide changes to current practices. Additionally, it 
seems only logical that recurring systems-wide challenges observed in AARs data should be 
incorporated into the structure and content of emergency preparedness exercises to ensure that 
emergency and disaster simulations regularly and realistically present responders with the most 
representative and most common response issues that they are likely to face.  
2. Study Aims  
In this project we have endeavored to perform a structured review of AARs to analyze how lessons 
learned from the response to real-incidents may be used to maximize knowledge management and 
quality improvement practices such as the design of public health emergency preparedness (PHEP) 
exercises for measuring system level preparedness and improvement efforts. We chose as a source of 
data the “Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov)” system, a joined program of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA that serves as the national, online repository of 
lessons learned, best practices, and innovative ideas for the emergency management and homeland 
security communities. A specific section of the LLIS.gov contains a database of AARs submitted by 
public health agencies, and hospitals describing the response to specific emergencies.  
In this study, we aimed to perform a content analysis of AARs contained in the LLIS.gov database 
to identify recurring challenges consistently reported by various states and local public health agencies 
in the response to different types of incidents. We also strived to identify the limitations of systematic 
learning that can be achieved due to existing weaknesses in the way AARs are developed. With our results, 
we have attempted to describe how systems can confront these challenges, by ensuring that identified 
recurring response issues are incorporated into the design of future emergency preparedness exercises. 
3. Methods 
Within the LLIS database we searched for AARs describing the public health system response to 
two different types of events: the 2009–2010 H1N1 pandemic and three hurricanes Ike (2008), Gustav Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9  2952 
 
 
(2008) and Katrina (2005). AARs were extracted in March 2011 and considered for inclusion in the 
review if submitted by a U.S. state, county or city public health agency, focused on a public health 
system response to a real-incidents (as opposed to an exercise), and reported in a semi-structured or 
structured manner with sufficient information so that analysis of specific public health capabilities 
could be performed. Each AAR was reviewed, coded and notes taken by two reviewers who 
independently categorized, sorted, and labeled selected statements within themes and subthemes. Our 
goal was not only to count the statements, but also to fracture the data and rearrange them into 
categories that facilitate comparison between events in the same categories [11]. The data abstraction 
tool that we developed included the following categories: event type, capability(ies) evaluated, 
challenges faced during the response, and type of format of the AAR. The two reviewers 
independently identified themes and subthemes that emerged from the text and agreement on such 
categories was achieved by discussion. See Figure 1 for a description of the reviewing process. 
The reviewers analyzed the response issues using the framework provided by the Public Health 
Preparedness Capabilities developed by U.S. CDC in March 2011 [12]. The analysis focused on the 
following three capabilities: (1) Emergency Public Information and Warning—the ability to develop, 
coordinate, and disseminate information, alerts, warnings, and notifications to the public and incident 
management responders; (2) Information Sharing—the ability to conduct multijurisdictional, 
multidisciplinary exchange of health-related information and situational awareness data among 
federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal levels of government, and the private sector; and   
(3) Emergency Operations Coordination (EOC)—the ability to direct and support an event or incident 
with public health or medical implications by establishing a standardized, scalable system of 
oversight, organization, and supervision consistent with jurisdictional standards and practices and 
with the National Incident Management System.  
Descriptive statistics were performed to determine the recurrence of the themes by each capability 
from all AARs (independently of the type of event). Frequencies of subthemes were calculated using 
the total number of subthemes identified within the pool of statements derived from each theme. 
Statistical analysis was performed using the statistical package STATA version 11, College Station, 
Texas. We considered the pool of reviewed AARs as if it were a unified source of information 
describing the overall response of multiple U.S. public health agencies to the two types of incidents 
being selected for the analysis. In our analysis, we were not interested in describing differences across 
agencies which would have been impossible to determine due to the extreme variability in the quality, 
format and richness of information provided by each AAR. The content analysis of the AARs was 
performed aiming to identify common themes (response challenges) and subthemes (specific problems 
within each response challenge) experienced by public health systems across the U.S. in employing 
such capabilities.  
4. Results 
Ninety-one AARs met the primary criteria for inclusion in our study. Among the original   
ninety-one AARs included for evaluation, six did not have any information about the three capabilities 
being selected, and were therefore excluded, forty-one had sufficient information (at least one 
statement) for the content analysis of Emergency Public Information and Warning, thirty-one for the Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9  2953 
 
 
analysis of Information Sharing and thirty-two for the analysis of Emergency Operations 
Coordination. Of the ninety-one AARs, thirty-six focused on the response to hurricanes (twenty-six on 
Gustav and/or Ike and ten on Katrina) and fifty-five on the response to H1N1. Most were from state 
health departments (forty-eight), fourteen were from health departments operating at the county level, 
eleven from health departments serving a city or town, and the rest (eighteen) were from either 
hospitals, universities, or federal agencies (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Flowchart showing the AARs review process.  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Emergency Public Information and Warning 
Of the forty-one AARs describing a specific challenge associated with the capability of emergency 
public information and warning, we were able to extrapolate one-hundred-sixteen different statements. 
Only four of these statements, however, were derived from AARs describing the response to a hurricane, 
and therefore the results related to the analysis of this specific capability should generally be interpreted in 
AARs excluded: 
  18 focused on the response of agencies 
other than public health (e.g., hospitals, 
universities,) 
  6 did not have information on the 
capabilities under review 
41 AARs had information on 
Emergency Public 
Information and Warning 
116 statements extracted  
 
16 themes and 61 sub-themes 
derived from the content 
analysis 
81 statements extracted  
 
11 themes and 52 sub-themes 
derived from the content 
analysis 
179 statements extracted  
 
15 themes and 56 sub-themes 
derived from the content 
analysis  
AARs describing response to different types of events 
identified from LLIS.gov database of AARs: 
  55 H1N1 AARs (2009–2010) 
  36 Hurricane AARs 
  Ike (2008) 
  Gustav (2008) 
  Katrina (2005) 
67 AARs were included in the final 
review of which:
31 AARs had information on 
Information Sharing 
32 AARs had information on 
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the context of the response to the H1N1 pandemic only. Content analysis of the one-hundred-sixteen 
statements was performed and sixteen themes and sixty-one sub-themes were derived. Among the sixteen 
themes the three most frequently reported were: communication difficulties about the vaccine (15%), 
difficulty in managing the helpline (14%), obstacles in the process of releasing timing information (12%).  
In terms of communication about the vaccine, the most frequent issues being reported were related to 
communication about vaccine safety and rumor control (67%), followed by communication about 
vaccine distribution-including both quantities and timing of distribution (17.%) and vaccine efficacy 
(11%). Many public health agencies reported activating a helpline number to receive calls from the 
public, however management issues were frequently consisting of: lack of staff available to cover the 
service (31%), lack of medical expertise (19%), inadequate publicity of the helpline number (19%), lack 
of a triage system to re-direct calls (especially those with specific medical content) (12%), and lack of 
clarity about the triggers for activating and de-activating the service (12%). In terms of release of timing 
information, the most frequent issue was related to the agencies’ ability to process and release new 
information (50%), which was often reported to be complex and time consuming. As an example, in one 
AAR reviewed, it was noted by an agency that the formal process for approval and release of information 
to the public during the emergency was treated the same as it was during routine operation, therefore the 
need to develop pre-approved messages to hasten the process was suggested. Other issues related to the 
timing of release of information were either context-specific, such as late evacuation orders, or audience-
specific, such as late communication to school districts directors or the media. 
A list of most frequent themes and subthemes derived from the analysis of this capability is 
provided in Table 1.  
Table 1. Analysis of themes and sub-themes for the capability of emergency public 
information and warning. 
Emergency Public Information and Warning (116 statements) 
Most frequent themes (proportion *)  Most frequent subthemes within each theme (proportion **) 
Communication difficulties  
about the vaccine (15%) 
 Vaccine safety and rumor control (67%) 
 Vaccine distribution-including both quantities and timing of 
distribution (17%) 
 Vaccine efficacy (11%) 
 
Difficulty in managing  
the helpline (14%) 
 Lack of staff available to cover the service (31%) 
 Lack of medical expertise (19%) 
 Inadequate publicity of the helpline number (19%) 
 Lack of a triage system to re-direct calls (especially those with 
specific medical content) (12%) 
 Lack of clarity of when to activate and de-activate  
the service (12%) 
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Table 1. Cont. 
Emergency Public Information and Warning (116 statements) 
Most frequent themes (proportion *)  Most frequent subthemes within each theme (proportion **) 
Obstacles in the process of releasing 
timing information (12%) 
 Agencies’ ability to process and release new information was 
complex and time consuming (50%) 
Difficulty in developing appropriate 
client advertising of flu clinics (9%) 
 Difficulty in predicting the timing and availability of vaccine 
and consequent frequent changes in the flu clinics’ schedules 
(45%) 
Inconsistency of messages (8%)  No subtheme identified 
Lack of activation of a Joint 
Information Center (JIC) (8%) 
No subtheme identified 
* Number of statements referring to a specific theme over the number of statements identified for the selected capability. 
**Number of statements referring to specific subtheme over the number of statements identified for the selected subtheme. 
Table 2. Analysis of themes and sub-themes for the capability of information sharing. 
Information Sharing (81 statements) 
Most frequent themes (proportion *)   Most frequent subthemes (proportion **)  
Difficulty in sharing information with 
external partners (31%) 
 Lack of communication with health care providers and 
schools (39%)  
 Differences in terminology used by different organizations 
(<5%) 
 Differing communication systems (<5%) 
 Confusion about the role of public health within the 
response system (<5%) 
 The existence of multiple, competing channels of 
communication (<5%) 
 Inconsistency of messages (<5%) 
Lack of training in the use of technology 
(27%) 
 Lack of training in the use of specific communication 
systems for example, the Health Alert Network (HAN) 
program and Web-EOC (14%) 
 Problems with the use of more generic instruments of 
communication such as conference calling, radio systems and 
appropriate website design to facilitate dissemination of 
information across agencies (13%) 
Difficulty in tracking  
information (25%) 
 
 Information overload and redundancy (29%) 
 Excessively frequent changes in the information being 
produced (18%) 
 Very lengthy situation reports (12%) 
Difficulty in sharing information across 
different groups within the  
same organization (15%) 
 Lack of clarity between daily job versus emergency 
operations priorities (28%) 
 Unnecessary duplication of efforts and unclear staff 
notifications (<5%) 
* Number of statements referring to a specific theme over the number of statements identified for the selected capability. 
**Number of statements referring to specific subtheme over the number of statements identified for the selected subtheme.  
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4.2. Information Sharing  
Out of the thirty-one AARs describing a specific challenge associated with the capability of 
information sharing, we were able to extrapolate eighty-one statements, of which fifty-eight were 
derived from AARs focusing on the response to H1N1, and twenty-three from AARs describing the 
response to a hurricane (eighteen on Gustav and/or Ike and five on Katrina). Content analysis of the 
eighty-one statements was performed and eleven themes and fifty-two sub-themes were derived. 
Among the eleven themes, the three most frequently reported were: difficulty in sharing information 
with external partners (31%), lack of training in the use of technology (27%), and difficulty in tracking 
information (25%)..  
Analysis of subthemes helped us to describe specific issues within each of the challenges reported 
above. In terms of communication with external partners, a main issue was a lack of communication with 
health care providers and schools (39%) as a result of poor organizational and individual level 
connections among agencies. One specific example cited in an AAR by one organization was that, 
during the H1N1 pandemic, they reported that staff had no access to a comprehensive list of healthcare 
providers that they felt should be included in the information sharing process. In terms of lack of training 
in the use of technology, two main subthemes emerged. The first was related to lack of training in the use 
of specific communication systems (14%), such as the Health Alert Network (HAN) program and the 
Web-EOC. The second in frequency (13%) was related to lack of training in the use of more generic 
instruments of communication such as conference calling (lack of knowledge in the use of conference 
calls programs and lack of clarity on how to structure the conference calls), radio systems (device 
programming errors, issues related to lack of wireless system reliability), and challenges in developing 
websites appropriately designed to facilitate dissemination of information across agencies. Tracking of 
information (i.e., tracing and capturing information from multiple sources) was also cited as a challenge 
because of information overload and redundancy (29%), excessively frequent changes in the information 
being produced (18%), and very lengthy situation reports (12%). A list of most frequent themes and 
subthemes derived from the analysis of this capability is provided in Table 2.  
4.3. Emergency Operations Coordination (EOC) 
Out of the thirty-two AARs describing the capability of EOC operations, we were able to 
extrapolate one-hundred-seventy-nine statements describing specific challenges, of which one 
hundred-nineteen were derived from AARs focusing on the response to H1N1 and sixty from AARs 
describing the response to hurricanes. Content analysis of the one-hundred-seventy-nine statements 
was performed, and fifteen themes and fifty-six sub-themes were derived. Among the fifteen themes, 
the three most frequently reported were: (1) confusion in roles and responsibilities across responders 
assigned to the EOC (23%); (2) lack of use of the Incident Command System (ICS) (17%), and   
(3) difficulty in consistently developing and using situation reports (14%).  
Some of the subthemes that emerged in terms of confusion in roles and responsibilities in the EOC 
included confusion of job tasks and functions among various response personnel (43%), poor depth of 
knowledge of individual response roles among response personnel (19%), overlap in roles and 
responsibilities among various sections of the EOC (14%), use of new staff for supervisory roles Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9  2957 
 
 
(10%), and switching of roles without coordination (7%). Lack of use of the ICS among responders 
was very commonly cited as due to lack of training (68%). In terms of difficulty in developing situation 
reports, subthemes included difficulty in gathering data resulting in fragmented and inconsistent 
reports (46%), lack of an organized format making the reports difficult to read (12%), insufficient 
distribution of reports to appropriate parties (12%), lack of follow-up on the information reported 
(12%), and lack of familiarity with electronic tracking systems (12%). A list of most frequent themes 
and subthemes derived from the analysis of this capability is provided in Table 3.  
Table 3. Analysis of themes and sub-themes for the capability of emergency operation 
coordination (EOC). 
Emergency Operations Coordination (EOC) (179 statements) 
Most frequent themes (proportion *)  Most frequent subthemes (proportion **) 
Confusion in roles and responsibilities 
within ICS (23%) 
 Confusion of job tasks and function among various response 
personnel (43%), 
 Poor depth of knowledge of individual response roles among 
response personnel (19%) 
 Overlap in roles and responsibilities among various sections of 
the EOC (14%) 
 Use of new staff for supervisory roles (10%) 
 Switching of roles without coordination (7%) 
Poor familiarization and/or use of the 
Incident Command System (17%) 
 Training needs including leadership training (68%) 
 Systems’ lack of formal command structure (<5%) 
 Lack of compliance and competence in filling out the required 
ICS forms (<5%) 
Difficulty in aggregating and utilizing 
situation reports (14%) 
 Difficulty in gathering and collecting data resulting in 
fragmented and inconsistent reports (46%) 
 Lack of organized format that made the reports difficult  
to read (12%) 
 Insufficient dissemination of reports to appropriate  
entities (12%) 
 Lack of follow-up on information reported (12%) 
 Lack of familiarity with electronic tracking systems (12%) 
Communication and coordination 
issues (10%) 
 Poor communication among various sections of the EOC (32%) 
 Poor communication and coordination between the EOC and 
external partners (32%) 
 Poor and inconsistent coordination between the EOC and the 
media (21%) 
Confusion in response activities versus 
day to day activities (5%) 
 Failure to release responders from daily activities (44%) 
 Lack of clear assignment of response roles among responding 
personnel (33%) 
Poor incident action planning (5%)   Difficulty in distributing incident action plans (33%) 
 Difficulty in developing incident action plans (22%) 
 Lack of clearly defined response objectives (22%) 
Lack of implementation of a developed incident action plan (11%) 
* Number of statements referring to a specific theme over the number of statements identified for the selected capability.  
**Number of statements referring to specific subtheme over the number of statements identified for the selected subtheme.  
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4.4. Distribution of Themes and Subthemes across Types of Incidents 
For the capabilities of information sharing and EOC operations, we could tabulate frequencies of 
themes and subthemes by type of event: H1N1 pandemic versus hurricanes (Table 4). However,   
for the capability of emergency public information and warning such analysis could not be performed 
due to the fact that 96% of statements were derived from the response to H1N1, and essentially   
very little information was provided in the AARs about communication to the public during the 
response to hurricanes.  
Table 4. Distribution of themes across types of incidence. 
Top Recurring challenges for EOC 
operations by event 
Total  
n = 179 
H1N1  
(n = 119) 
Hurricanes  
(n = 60) 
P-value 
a 
Confusion in roles and responsibilities  42 (23%)  31 (26%)  11 (18%)  0.5 
Poor familiarization and/or use of the 
Incident Command System 
31 (17%)  16 (14%)  15 (25%)  0.2 
Difficulty in aggregating and utilizing 
situation reports  
26 (14%)  19 (16%)  7 (12%)  0.6 
Communication and coordination issues 
among various sections of the EOC and/or 
with external partners 
19 (11%)  11 (10%)  8 (13%)  0.5 
Top Recurring challenges for 
Information sharing by event 
Total  
n = 81 
H1N1  
(n = 58) 
Hurricanes  
(n = 23) 
P-value 
a 
Communication with external partners  25 (31%)  23 (40%)  2 (9%)  0.06 
Information tracking  20 (25%)  13 (22%)  7 (30%)  0.6 
Use of technology  22 (27.5%)  12 (21%)  10 (43%)  0.2 
Communication across different teams 
within the same organization 
12 (15%)  11 (19%)  1 (4.3%) 
b  0.2 
a P-value calculated using Fisher’s exact test. 
b Not a top recurring challenge for hurricanes. 
Results showed that, for the capability of information sharing, similar themes were identified 
regardless of the type of incident. During H1N1, the top three challenges were: (1) communication 
with external partners (40%); (2) information tracking (22%); and (3) communication across different 
teams within the same organization (19%). The top three challenges in the response to hurricanes 
were: (1) use of technology (43%); (2) information tracking (30%); and (3) communication with 
external partners (9%). Despite similarities in the challenges being reported, specific response issues 
were slightly different between the two types of incidents. In terms of communication with external 
partners during H1N1, the main challenge for the public health agencies was to establish an effective 
communication with new partners such as the private sector, healthcare organizations and school 
districts. During the response to hurricanes, a frequent challenge was inconsistency in the use of 
terminology across agencies causing misunderstanding of the content of the messages. Information 
tracking was a challenge for both the response to H1N1 and to hurricanes with cases ranging from 
redundancy of information to lack of information. During the response to hurricanes, the damages to 
the communication infrastructure such as radio and wireless communications systems were the cause 
of major communication difficulties. Lack of training in the use of Health and Homeland Alert Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9  2959 
 
 
Network (HHAN) and Web-EOC was found to be a challenge both during H1N1 as well as during the 
response to hurricanes. Finally, communication across different teams within the same organization 
seemed to be a greater issue during H1N1 than during the response to hurricanes due to lack of clarity 
about shifts between routine activities and emergency operations. This may have been, at least in part, 
due to the extended timeframe of the response to H1N1. 
The major themes noted in the AARs discussing EOC operations were also similar for the two 
different types of events being studied, though not in similar order. The top three themes that emerged 
in the H1N1 response were: (1) confusion in roles and responsibilities (26%); (2) difficulty in 
developing and using situation reports (16%); and (3) lack of use of the ICS (13%). The top three 
themes that emerged from the response to hurricanes were: (1) confusion in roles and responsibilities 
(18%); (2) lack of use of the ICS (25%), and (3) communication and coordination issues among 
various sections of the EOC and/or with external partners (13%). Examples cited in AARs include 
EOC personnel reporting to multiple people causing diversion of information from its intended flow, 
and lack of clarity about each agency’s primary designated contacts at each partner organization.  
4.5. Notes on the Structure of the AARs 
During the content analysis of the ninety-one AARs selected for this study, we also took note of 
each AAR’s structure and format as well as the way authors defined and examined “capabilities”. 
Among the AARs that had descriptions of performance on at least one of the three capabilities being 
examined in our study, only 67% had a report structure with text specifically referring to the concept 
of a “capability.” Of those, approximately 80% of those reports followed the Target Capability List 
(TCL) [13] definition to structure the report. In addition, there was no consistency on what was 
included in each capability section, on how the capabilities were named or defined, or on the “response 
issues or functions” to be included within each capability and incident. As an example, surprisingly, 
over 90% of AARs describing the response to a hurricane had no observations on the capability of 
emergency public information and warning. 
5. Discussion  
Knowledge management is a discipline that attempts to use a variety of strategies and practices to 
identify, describe and disseminate the insights and experiences gained by individuals and groups over 
time [3,14].When these insights and experiences are gathered together in documents such as AARs and 
critically analyzed, they comprise an opportunity to identify common and/or recurring systems-level 
challenges. If the identified insights and experiences have recurring themes across different types of 
threats and across multiple types of systems, they also present a direct mandate for responders, 
organizations, and systems to address such challenges and create a requirement to test them in future 
exercises to ensure that planned improvements are successful. In other words, evidence of common 
and recurring challenges must be directly addressed by planners, and any implemented improvements 
must be tested through the iterative cycle of planning, testing, measuring and improving, as supported 
in the FEMA guidance for the development of AARs and Improvement Plans (IPs). 
The LLIS.gov system is an example of a repository of information where insights and experiences 
that could support national knowledge management are documented following the response to large Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9  2960 
 
 
scale emergencies. While the existence of this repository is well known to public health and 
emergency management agencies, as evidenced by the number of AARs continuously uploaded to the 
system, no research to date had focused on the possible use of the database for knowledge management 
purposes. In our study, we have identified a number of common themes and subthemes of “lessons 
learned” that we were able to derive from the AARs submitted to the LLIS system that are representing 
cross-cutting lessons. We believe many of these themes identified through content analysis provide 
data in support of several current national and international initiatives to improve preparedness and 
response efforts in the areas of communications systems and situational awareness, use of the ICS, 
information sharing and public information and warning. Further, we believe that recurring content 
analysis of AARs databases has substantial potential utility for local and state exercise planners. 
Currently, creation of a multi-year training and exercise program (MYTEP), as recommended in the 
HSEEP, is a complicated endeavor that relies on many factors including state and/or local capabilities 
assessments, homeland security strategy, and past local AARs and IPs. The AARs and IPs most 
commonly used for MYTEPs, however, are limited by the exercises and incidents that have recently 
occurred in specific local realities. Instead, if the most common response challenges that have 
routinely proved problematic could be identified within nationally aggregated pools of AARs, such 
data could be used by practitioners when drafting their MYTEP, so that testing of plans and response 
to such challenges could be included, and hopefully not to be “learned” again.  
A limitation of our study is the fact that only two types of incidents were taken into consideration: 
the H1N1 pandemic and the response to hurricanes. Indeed, other emergency incidents such as floods, 
mass shooting, chemical spills, radiological events were not included in our study, however, at the time 
of the data extraction, the database contained approximately 400 AARs from public health and 
healthcare entities analyzing their response to real events. Our analysis, therefore, included nearly one 
quarter of the total number of public health AARs available, which we believe is a fairly reasonable 
size upon which to draw preliminary conclusions.  
As recommended by the HSEEP guidelines, some AARs were noted to include recommendations for 
improvements that would address the problems they described. However, in many cases, the 
recommendations were often rather generic and could not be translated into concrete actions. For example, 
one agency reported the need to “create a robust crisis emergency response communication plan,” but was 
unable to describe further what such a plan would entail. Another agency suggested that, when 
communicating, “the information should be given in an effective way in order to reach the target 
population,” leaving the reviewers with questions about the definitions of “effective” and “target audience? 
Many of the AARs that we examined also lacked specific examples to support the individual 
authors’ statements about what went wrong and lacked root cause analysis of the response challenges 
experienced. Further, the frequent lack of use of a consistent structure in AARs makes identification of 
specific problems and root causes extremely challenging and time consuming when trying to aggregate 
lessons learned. Overall, we believe that providing both more detailed examples of response 
challenges, as well as greater use of root cause analysis methodology within the AARs could help 
broaden others’ ability to understand the problems documented in an AAR and improve their ability to 
apply the lessons learned to their own entity and system. Further, we believe that improved use of a 
consistent structure for all AARs entered in the system would facilitate faster and simpler use of 
structured approaches to identify the problems in the response that may be common to multiple Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9  2961 
 
 
responders and therefore need urgent attention by all. At present, individual state and local health 
departments, as well as healthcare providers, commonly produce AARs of widely ranging structure 
and quality following emergency and disaster events. This is likely due to a number of internal factors, 
including differences among entities in expertise in event evaluation, limited personnel availability, 
competing priorities, political concerns, and others. It is also likely due, to external factors as well, 
such as the competing and conflicting federal capabilities lists, cumbersome current AAR guidance 
and structures, and concerns about the use of AAR data at the state and federal levels for 
accountability purposes.  
We believe there are possible actions that might improve the overall quality of AARs that may lead 
to higher value data being reported and improved identification of systematic response challenges. 
First, the federal government might make available examples of “best practice” of AARs that could 
guide authors who are attempting to improve their documents. Second, national AAR repositories 
could be indexed and be searchable by public health and health care emergency preparedness 
capabilities to facilitate the identification of common response challenges and add value and meaning 
in the use of the capability-based approach when drafting AARs. Third, the government could consider 
building financial incentives that encourage meeting certain quality criteria in the production of AARs, 
such as use of the capabilities frameworks, performing root cause analysis, and providing concrete 
examples, though we acknowledge that, in the current fiscal environment this might be difficult, and 
the magnitude of the incentive would likely not be substantial enough to motivate change. 
Nonetheless, successfully encouraging local and state practitioners to improve the overall quality of 
the AARs produced and submitted to central repositories, will have greater potential for learning not 
just for the individual entities crafting the AARs, but for the health and public health sector as a whole.  
6. Conclusions  
By performing a systematic analysis of ARRs submitted through the LLIS.gov system, we were 
able to identify common challenges that have consistently emerged during the public health responses 
to different types of incidents. These challenges represent lessons that do not need to be “learned 
again” in future disasters, but rather problems that must be faced now in the planning, testing, 
measuring, and implementing cycle of public health and emergency management (see Tables 1–3). By 
reviewing the AARs, we believe that public health and emergency management leaders can develop 
data-driven support system for identifying key areas of concern when prioritizing planning efforts. 
Although knowledge management approaches are known to work when all members of the target 
community have the same technical goals, are motivated by a common interest, are organized on a flat 
hierarchy, and are receptive to innovation [15]. Further, we believe that future exercises should include 
these challenges in their objectives as a mechanism for ensuring that testing and planning efforts are 
successful. Our study suggests the value of AARs as potential tools to learn from real incidents and 
underlines the need to develop systematic ways to synthesize the lessons learned from such documents.  
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